Trends. Nuclear Weapons Redux by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 10 Issue 9 Article 5 
3-9-2001 
Trends. Nuclear Weapons Redux 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Other Political 
Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (2001) "Trends. Nuclear Weapons Redux," International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 10 : Iss. 
9 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol10/iss9/5 
This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
1 
 
Title: Trends. Nuclear Weapons Redux 
Author: Editor 
Volume: 10 
Issue: 9 
Date: 2001-03-09 
Keywords: Deterrence, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Weapons 
 
Rationales for reducing the number of various nuclear weapons worldwide are multi-varied. One 
rationale to abolish all nuclear weapons is founded on the notion that war and other kinds of armed 
conflict can, therefore, be averted. Another rationale to abolish nuclear weapons is that possessing 
them is intrinsically immoral and being moral is so important that abolishment must occur. Yet another 
rationale to abolish nuclear weapons is that war or conflict won't be averted, but the types of war and 
conflict that will occur will be more moral or lead to fewer casualties, fewer severe casualties, or less 
residual damage than what would occur through nuclear war. 
 
Reduction may instead refer not to abolishment but to a partial elimination of nuclear weapons. But to 
what level? Some adherents merely cite the numbers of warheads available as prima facie evidence for 
some level of reductions. That is, the numbers are too big based on some inferred or implied absolute or 
relative "too-bigness". Other adherents refer to how various numbers of warheads are much more 
powerful than the bomb used against Hiroshima. That is, the cumulative power or megatonnage 
translates into some inferred or implied absolute or relative "too-bigness." Still others refer to how 
much damage various numbers of weapons would cause if employed--in the same "too-bigness" mode. 
 
All of these rationales depend on belief systems about cause and effect that ultimately must be 
accepted on faith. That is, decisions about assets created through science must be based on other than 
scientific foundations. Moreover, the push to develop rationales to reduce nuclear weapons rarely 
seriously entertain the notion that there are not enough such weapons. Given that some positive 
features of nuclear weapons are based on variants of deterrence, one might reasonably advocate that 
more might be better--i.e., that a higher number or more size matters. How much to reduce may need 
to become why not more? (See Deutsch, M. (1987). Going beyond "Beyond deterrence." Journal of 
Social Issues, 43, 149-153; Horvath, P. (1996). Nuclear weapons concerns, agency beliefs, and social 
responsibility values in disarmament activism. Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 2, 17-35; 
Kerrey, B. (March 2, 2001). Armed to excess. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Kull, S. 
(1988). Minds at war: Nuclear reality and the inner conflicts of defense policymakers. Basic Books; 
Nelson, L., & Beardsley, G. L. (1987). Toward an interdisciplinary model of barriers to nuclear arms 
control. Social Science Journal, 24, 375-388; Wessells, M.G. (1995). Social-psychological determinants of 
nuclear proliferation: A dual-process analysis. Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 1, 49-65.) 
(Keywords: Deterrence, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Weapons.) 
 
 
 
1
: Trends. Nuclear Weapons Redux
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2001
